Constriction (2) - SÜLEYMAN SEYFI ÖĞÜN

Constriction (2)

For the 2015 elections, AK Party is making choices that are reinforcing its politics for the alliances against them. AK Party's initial expansive and extensive politics paint a picture out of the ordinary. This is a picture that can be seen clearly. There is a widespread thought about this picture and how it is viewed, that this was the point where AK Party got caught with the exhaustion syndrome. The picture is right; however the view is wrong. The primary point of emphasis is that this does not properly show AK Party's potential.

It is without a doubt that AK Party has been subjected to the wearing effects of ruling the government for more than one year now. You must receive this as being normal. The 2015 elections will be one where AK Party renews its rosters. At this point, the opposition will be at a state where it is appealing for help with the internal disputes of the party. The dispute between Mr. Arınç and Mr. Gökçek spawned great hope for the opposition parties. They wanted these events to escalate to make it easier for them. Some journalists close to the opposition were waiting for signs of this every time they wrote. There was constant emphasis that the efforts of Mr. Erdoğan and Mr. Davutoğlu were discordant. The incident with Mr. Hakan Fidan being shown as an isolated figure leaving Mr. Erdoğan's central bank, the delay of the Transparency package and etc. were being dramatized and used as a political marketing tool to show the supposed fall of a government.

It would be simple-minded to think that with AK Party's roster change will come a new vision that will be lived smoothly without a hitch. However to think that this period is going to bring deep cracks must be a type of political gambling. Every shedding of the skin is going to be painful. To view this period in one dimension will be deficient. It is reasonable that this period is problematic, and it is constricting AK Party. However, to evaluate this constriction within the election strategy of AK Party and to see this as a definite solution would be more correct. The surfaced tension of the election isn't forced to be determined after the elections. Even while knowing that they will go through some political losses, AK Party still undertook the Reconciliation Process. We can predict that this will cause a loss for them in the nationalist base. However we do not know how much this reactionary wave will be realized and to what extent it will reflect on the choices. The other scenario that is constantly being brought to light on the other side is that especially after Kobani, the pro-Kurdish constituents sharpened and a drop in votes from the Kurdish people who were supporting AK Party would occur. Maybe so, but this is not for sure. We do not know if our Kurdish countrymen will make a choice that will gain from the concrete normalization of their lives, if not then a choice considering the romanticism.

CHP, who is making consolidations around neo-nationalist dogmas, seems to be the most dramatic actor in the constriction period. The side with the least hope of increasing their votes is Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu's party. We must also say that they are the side that is left with the most excitement in regards to their base of consolidation politics. There is a risk that the ones who are offended can slide to MHP or to VP. There are strong notices that some CHP candidates are leaning towards HDP. We can predict that there is a gnawing effect on CHP's base from the campaign that HDP is pursuing towards the Alevi countrymen.

MHP is the most “lucky” winner of the elections. It is evident that Mr. Devlet Bahçeli's party will increase their votes even though they did not produce a new diplomacy outside of the Turkist consolidation. However, personally I am in doubt that this will find the 20% percent range.

CHP and MHP are in a situation where they have tied all of their calculations according to AK Party's losses. However, this states that locking on shows the losses on their own bases. Doesn't this explain the dependency on AK Party's diplomacy and Turkey's opposition crisis, mainly being CHP and MHP, and the rivals' hope of success that is collected with failure?

As for HDP, they cannot show a performance that can concretize the 'becoming Turkish' claim. They only have one expression on this path. However in practicality, especially after Kobani, they took steps that reinforced their pro-Kurdish diplomacy. Not by transforming their vision by increasing the %10 threshold of being successful in 'becoming Turkish'; it is trying to surpass that threshold with calculations of capturing CHP's Alevi base.

Let us sum up what we wrote until now: Every party that is partaking in the election is pursuing a strategy and tactic that is constricting politics. This is very clear. Politics is in a situation of deadlock. Reactionary waves are present in the selection world in regards to the volume of the countless speculation that has been made. Above is the solution to the diplomacy that has been deadlocked or it will bring it to layers, in what volume will the candidates “reactional play” reflect in the ballot boxes. Their whole issue is to keep the votes that it has received until today with the least amount of loss from MHP's base and from the Kurdish people. As for MHP and HDP, they are troubled with maximizing the fluctuation in the bases of AK Party and CHP.

With the election on one side, there are two parties who can surpass the constriction of politics on the horizon: AK Party and HDP. This being two sided is essential for Turkey's salvation. If HDP puts its pro-Kurdish stance to one side and completes its 'becoming Turkish', then it will be a great victory for them. When it comes to AK Party, they are obliged to complete their developmental transformation with their new roster and vision. This must be completed in a synergic and active manner between Mr. Erdoğan and Mr. Davutoğlu, being the actors of this period.


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