The resolution process and continuity… - ALI BAYRAMOĞLU

The resolution process and continuity…

In recent years, the Kurdish issue has been one of the subjects significantly shaping the course of politics and democracy.

So today: the resolution process, in spite of all the crisis it faced, all the disturbances, being instrumentalizeddespitetheelection campaign, has a deterministic attribute both in terms of the point the country came to and its future.

The story of seeking a resolution for the issue is not new.

In terms of the state, we know that the searches for the first contact with Öcalan in order to cease the PKK rebellion started in the Özal period and continued with the soldiers in the days of February 28.

In the second phase, we also know that after the aggravation of the clashes again between the years 2005 and 2008, the organization was contacted, the informational relations were continued, and between 2008 and 2011 under the name of the Oslo process, there was a hidden negotiation period.

It is obvious that by the end of 2012, this time a more transparent negotiation period started, this has been declared as the resolution process to the public opinion and it still continues.

The milestones of the last phase are:

The ceasefire that the PKK declared in the end of 2012 and has still been continuing, although it has rapidly been failing; the withdrawal of the armed forces in 2013; enacting a framework law for the resolution in 2014; the Dolmabahçe meeting on February 28 and stating the negotiation on what to be discussed among all the parties; and at long last on 2015 Newroz, Öcalan's speech that emphasizes the historical turning point from the aspect of the resolution…

When all these are placed in a row, three matters come forward:

- There is continuity from the aspect of searching for a resolution and willpower and Turkey has reached a certain level of maturity of experience.

It is a 30-year conflict, but only the last 15 years have witnessed the efforts to find a resolution to the conflict, and the last 10 years have witnessed a phase of a contact-dialogue-negotiation.

-The path has been shaped by constant gains. Time, experience and interaction have deepened more each passing day that the search for conflict resolution, in a line extending from the first contact to the Dolmabahçe negotiation.

By leaving the unreturnable points behind, from the aspects of legitimacy and expectation, even the institutionalization progress was taken.

In this context, the permanent inputs have been stronger than the damage of the crisis periods.

-For both the Kurdish movement and the political power, the peace process points at a political engagement hard to return. This engagement has affected the structuring and policies of the sides and shaped them.

Depending on the election campaigns, political parties' policy-making through the resolution process, in spite of the threats as “we finish, it finishes, it doesn't continue” and the possible tension that can be experienced in the future, after the election, the main rule will be activated, the deepening will continue in the resolution process.

The possibility of HDP's exceeding the threshold, Turkey's being in the preparation stage of a new constitution in every sense, the necessity for negotiation will give a new impetus to the Kurdish issue and resolution process, at least besides the present dynamics the new ones will be added.

No doubt about it...

Also it is obvious: The resolution process, the necessity and conditions for reconciliation around this process and dispersion of the conflicting atmosphere, and increasing the emphasis on democracy and resolution, even in order to reduce the social polarization of the peace process, can play an important role.

No doubt that the Kurdish issue requires a new “political code system” and a new political structuring.

This has to be a system that will of course respond to the requests of the Kurds, but at that rate strengthen the country's integrity.

We are talking about “a system that can, besides accepting the cultural differences, the opportunities to process their existence, their taking part in decision-making about their habitat, activate cultural and social pluralism.”

Such a system will only satisfy “the necessities of resolution in the Kurdish issue” and “ participatory democracy needs”

The greatest risk in this direction are the dangerous internal encounterings, internal conflicts which the Adana and Mersin events targeted and provoked.

Avoiding this is the duty of all the political actors, foremost the rulership.


+

Cookies are used limited to the purposes in th e Personal Data Protection Law No.6698 and in accordance with the legislation. For detailed information, you can review our cookie policy.