It was remarkable; a couple of days ago, HDP Co-Chairman Selahattin Demirtaş participated in a TV Program on IMC Television, and by saying, “When Erdoğan saw in the surveys that the Resolution Process was not providing AK Party any votes, especially after the Dolmabahçe agreement, he had taken a step back,” he was relating the latest crisis to this.
Later on, he made a statement that, for them, “the resolution process is more important than the elections.” Demirtaş's “no matter what the results are in the elections, no matter if we succeed in exceeding the threshold or not, the process will and should continue” statement is actually underlining an essential reality from the point of the Kurdish movement.
Demirtaş's statement is of the sort that shows what distance is required to listen to the statements related with the Resolution Process during the election atmosphere, where the competition between the political parties is intense. This distance is once again showing us that the statements like, “As of now, the process has come to an end”, as the İmralı committee previously stated, are carrying political and conjunctural quality for the elections.
Among all of these, it's possible to attain two results that emerge automatically and are related with the Resolution Process.
First one is; that the Resolution Process is subject to the election rivalry, and is instrumentalized and becoming prominent within this frame.
As a matter of fact, if we are to put aside CHP's obscure attitude in the opposition, MHP has set one of the legs of their election campaign on the Resolution Process in order to steal some votes from AK Party. If the first reason, that brought HDP to the verge of exceeding the threshold, is their message towards the AK Party oppositions to refrain Erdoğan's power, then, the second reason is the image of an intrasystem party they gained with the Resolution Process, or more precisely, as the process became legitimated and internalized in the eyes of the community. As a matter of fact, HDP is following a path that is aware of this. They are putting an effort into sticking to a language close to Turkey's average, from its religion policy to its economy policy, and are not abstaining from raising the level of the bar related with the Resolution Process in their election campaign. On this matter, they were confined to making criticisms towards AK Party.
As for AK Party….
We can see that the political rulership is conducting two parallel campaigns.
On one side, the party and government, and on the other, the president are asking for votes in the squares, explaining the New Turkey and making fine adjustments related with the Resolution Process. Especially on the last matter, it's clear that the President is making the fine adjustment in the Resolution Process. After his rebuke about the Monitoring Committee and the Dolmabahçe agreement, it seems that the government had aligned behind Erdoğan's new attitude and language. Without a doubt, the actual reason for this is the fixations underlined by Demirtaş, in other words, the worries about votes.
In this case, the matter of “what kind of composition will be formed in the Parliament after June 7th” is important and designative. However, the essential here is, as the conjuncture changes after June 7th, to remove the pressure over the Resolution Process and set the train back on its rails to advance.
There are no structural obstacles ahead of this.
This fixation takes us to the second result related with the Resolution Process.
The Resolution Process is a phase, which cannot be turned back to a certain point in time by either the Kurdish movement, or the Turkish public opinion that is not reactive, or AK Party, and which exceeds, or more precisely, surrounds the political willpowers at this point.
The conjunctural pressures, and the rise-and-falls related with the process cannot remove this reality. Because, neither AK Party nor the Kurdish movement can politically carry the political picture that is the alternative of the Resolution Process.
The cost will be extremely heavy.