Turkey had survived November 1, which had been declared as the Support-Kobane day, free of damage. Of course, the “surviving free of damage” idiom might not sound so nice for a support day that is conducted for a city under trouble.
However, this was crucial. It was especially important for the organization to show that they had reached a point, where they stopped taking the risk of communal violence that might be an exterminator against the Resolution Process.
Without a doubt, right now, breaking the increasing worries and redounding operability to the Resolution Process, which had wavered and locked with the reciprocal salvos and demands, are the essential issues that the country and system are facing.
In this manner, where are we standing? Or, will the Peace Process continue advancing from the point it left off, in other words, before the October 6-7 incidents?
We should accept that while the developments like “November 1 Calmness” and “Turkey opening a separate place for Rojava within its Syria policy” had given hope, the road accident we experienced had some “corruptive” effects regarding the Peace Process that had revealed some problems.
Rojava is one of those. The north of Syria had completely come into play regarding Turkey’s Kurdish issue. Rojava was politically the indirect piece of the Peace Process, in the sense of the function it carried out in regards to the existence of the PYD, the PKK and Kurds. As for now, in a de facto way, and even directly, it had become one of its pieces. Today, all the powers’ strategies are being established and clashing accordingly to this. The “paradigm difference” between the Turkish and Kurdish sides, is the other one of the revealed incidents. This shadow of this difference, which had become clearer through Rojava and the October 6-7 incidents, had started to fall on the process in Turkey. Different views, expectations, accusations and confutations are rapidly increasing; the end of a phase, which we could qualify as a prelude, is being neared. In other words, the negotiation question and problem is becoming prominent for the Kurds, and PKK’s field control policy is becoming prominent as a public issue from the point of the state.
When we observe by taking these conditions and new inputs in consideration, there are four indicative “question/problem fields” related with the Resolution Process and Kurdish issue in the forthcoming period.
The first one is; will we experience the happenings at Rojava again through the domestic dynamics, present meeting deadlocks, and the junction of negotiation/public order?
In this sense, how can we overcome this deadlock?
The second one is; after the importance and even the decisiveness gained by the Rojava and Kobane factors, how will Turkey’s combination of Syria/Kurdish/Regional policies navigate? While the principles of Turkey’s Syria policy are remaining unshaken, what is the depth of the tendency of giving a separate specific weight to Rojava and Kobane within this frame? Will Turkey’s attempts in pipelining the humane (support to Kobane), political (Syria policy and pushing PYD to the Free Syrian Army) and strategic (Predicting a coalition for Rojava where PYD is included but not dominant) aspects, navigate suitably?
We are facing the following question in the third field; What will be the scale of the USA and international coalition’s Rojava policies, these policies’ position in the struggle with ISIL, and the effects of all these on the relations, which is built and will be built with PYD?
As for the last field, it is relations between the Kurdish groups. Rojava is advancing in becoming the confrontation field for these groups. It is surrounding the conflicts and rulership fight between these groups, and also, the intersecting points and possible partnerships. It is clear that this factor had gained more importance in the navigation of the Kurdish issue and Peace Process, compared to yesterday.
Also, without a doubt, the developments in each of these fields are of the quality that can affect other fields. Observing the course of events in the Kurdish issue and these questions also amounts to thinking within this context.