The operations conducted against the Gülen-led group"s tissue in the state are carrying great importance and being discussed as much as the elections that will be held in a couple of days.
And, it will be discussed for a while more.
In this sense, there a lot of questions. What kind of a nature does the relationship between AK Party and the Gülen-led group possess? What kind of a thing is this collaboration between this duo? Was AK Party aware of unlawfulness imputed at the Gülen-led group? Or do they carry the political responsibility of these? How did the religious structure pass from social and cultural activities to the political activity field? Why had an active rulership focus been produced from a cooperation layout?
Twenty years ago, the "serious pressure period", which had gravitated towards Islamic visibility, had given the first signs of the February 28 process and the "opening period" at the same time. While February 28 had been smashed in a couple of years, a new political sensibility door would be opened in the country. In the struggles and demands related with basic rights and freedoms, the rights and expectations that belong to religion are becoming prominent and even get a moral edge with its qualities (like public field definition) and actors (like AK Party)and starting to become a carrier in an important scale.
(1) In the 2000s and under these conditions, Turkey had experienced the "state-society-state relations" normalization in an up-down process. While the serious pressure over religious organizations had been lifted gradually, systematic proceedings oriented at religious officers and religious political actors had come to an end. Being a member of a congregation or a religious group within the state field had stopped being an issue. Without a doubt, one of the important factors that paved the way for the Gülen-led group is the democratization process within this frame, and the use of freedoms gained in civil, individual and sociological field with political abuse.
(2) On the other hand, in the 1980s, the Islamic movement that re-identifies itself with new dynamics was transforming its own domestic story in Turkey and traditional existence style was being tensed against cults and similar structures, the public field and the identity movements. Thus, when we had reached 2000s, traditional structures had greatly weakened. The most organized and strongest structure in this field had stayed as the Gülen-led group, which includes horizontal networks and a vertical hierarchy, who reaches from state to culture via the relations created with modern elements and even surrounds all of its members.
(3) In 2000s, the country had witnessed that the democratization normalization process had been experienced with great conflicts and tensions. Especially the period that ranges from 2003 to 2004, has been a period, in which old regime was dominant and directed at blocking the transformation period, threats and coup attempts were included. In this period, with the information gathered from members, whom took place in critical intelligence points and were mobilized in the direction of carrying the Gülen-led group or this group"s benefit, Gülen had been the one who was most aware of "coup threat". They were regarding themselves as the main target of such a threat. In the becoming civilian and opening period, they had embarked in political active propagation within the state like this. And they had gravitated to going in an open struggle with the old regime elements, rather than protecting themselves against it. The threat perception and the state of active organization within the state, which started at 1999 and continued in 2003 and 2004, was going to reach climax with the April 27th memorial and the memorandum sequence that follows it.
(4) So indeed the April 27 and 2007, forms the second great breaking point in the story. Likewise, the "natural and automatic coreligionist relation" between the congregation and AK Party rulership and personnel, would change shape from that day on and transform into an "undefined but de facto" cooperation.
Between 2002 and 2007, while AK Party watched reform policies on one hand, on the other hand they had been in trench warfare with the old setup"s establishments, soldiers, judiciary and universities. The April 27th and the action of closing that follows the 2007 elections, had left AK Party naked in the field of AK Party. What could cover a single organization was the Gülen-led group. With the Gülen-led group"s perception of threat and political organization drift, AK Party"s the parallelism of the encounter with the soldiers, had paved the way for an expected result. The Gülen-led groups structuring within the police and courthouse and AK Party"s pursuit had met. This meeting wasn"t a political alliance for AK Party, but rather a natural, legitimate situation against pressure and unlawfulness. From the point of the Prime Minister, it was "the meeting of the ones, whose foreheads are touching the kowtow around the pursuit of justice and law"… Within this frame, a new page has been opened with coup attempts, the answers given for annihilation attempts against political rulership"s political and sociological existence. Ergenekon judiciary process was the first move that symbolized this period.
AK Party was paving the way with the special authorized prosecution and court regulations, and advancing with Gülen-led group"s common structure and members along with other judges and prosecutors. This due, until 2010, in the period when everything stayed in the borders of law in an important scale, they had played an indicator role during Turkey"s civilizing and facing the past period. Though, from the point of the Gülen-led group, the struggle wasn"t only consisting of resistance and answers within the frame of law.
However, the story had changed rails with this frame.