Just when it looked like we were getting closer to a solution as part of the reconciliation process, an atmosphere was generated all of a sudden that points to a situation where everything has come to an end. Or the intention is that we come to such a conclusion.
It is an entirely separate question as to how solid the process is, or whether it represents what it should. But what is clear is that if the process is at an end then we will all pay the price together.
As part of the new equation in the region, it is not just the future of Turkey but also the future of the wider region that includes Iraq, Syria and Iran that has been indexed to the “Kurdish issue.”
In other words, the Kurdish issue will play a key role for all active actors in the region when it comes to the shaping of the Middle East. It is not easy to reach an absolute decision on how the bringing into play of this strategic value will benefit the Kurds, and even more so, how it will benefit other ethnicities, and what it will mean in terms of borders.
What is certain though is that the Kurdish issue has gained such importance that it won’t be left to the Kurds alone. The main issue is whether the future of the Middle East will be determined by external global actors like it was a century ago or whether it will be determined by the internal dynamics of the region.
Within this framework, it will prove beneficial to get reacquainted with some topics that have dropped off the radar:
-All policies implemented by the State to date, not only strengthened the impression that all the steps made toward betterment in the last 10 years were the result of the taking up of arms by the Kurdish organization, but also combined with the impression that all concessions obtained were extracted by force. As this impression began to grow, it turned into the biggest propaganda weapon for the PKK. As a result it created a formula that condemned right from the start any kind of betterment and goodwill.
-During the reconciliation process the PKK was effectively elevated to the status of directly representing and speaking on behalf of all Kurds. The accepting as an interlocutor of the organization representing one side of the parties in conflict, when aligned with the impressions mentioned above resulted in an atmosphere where everything, right to the core, was directed and stated based on the organization’s perspectives.
-A sense of exclusion arose amongst the Muslim Kurdish base and organizational structures linked to that base, which was both ideologically and socially distant from those Kurdish structures. As a result of this situation a large section that was left in the middle shifted to the PKK, which had softened its discourse compared to the past. One of the weakest rings in the process was created when the PKK attempted to incorporate the Muslim Kurdish base into its own monopoly and also include all others that didn’t adhere to the Stalinist secular ideology, thereby making it ready for any kind of international engagement.
-To be honest, Turkey’s strategy of putting the Barzani factor in the forefront to control the problem resulted in regional countries and countries outside the region finding themselves in conflict, based on different calculations made by each. The structuring of northern Iraq and its oil policy -- which gained Turkey’s backing -- and would mean the literal division of Iraq, was considered dangerous from a geostrategic perspective by Iran in particular.
-Turkish policy was compatible with America’s traditional strategy of seeking a solution to the Kurdish issue via northern Iraq. But Turkey was left on the opposite side of the fence with both the United States and Iran when it came to the subject of oil trade. As part of this framework it can be said that the intervention with Germany as its pivot, and the United States-Iran-Russia axis was the point of tangency.
-The consolidation of the image that Kobane is where the secular West is engaged in a war of liberation against radical Islam, added to a deliberate perception campaign being carried out by Western media, is the result of the combination mentioned above.
-To be honest, the intention is to create a history for a probable independent Kurdish movement based on Kobane. Because a Stalingrad-type legend is required for a secular Kurdish movement…
-A need has always been felt for a tale of heroes and heroism in order to write about a fictional nation-history. Attempts to bestow symbolic value upon Kobane should be read as a new intervention to create a new equation.
-In order to tackle the traditional Kurdish characteristic traits of being confrontational and disruptive, the leadership of Öcalan was created that would convey, or conveyed, a representation that removed all divisions. The fragmentation of this rarely witnessed common leadership cult will mean the organization will lose the advantage it had of addressing a wider base. It should be debated as to how prepared the organization is in regard to the political consequences that would arise from the establishing of a new sociological equation.
-New definitions are required that will distinguish between Kurds and the organization, that will synchronize all the demands of the Kurdish public as part of the process, and will recognize the right of different representations to exist.